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Timeline Database

Every published record in the TelcoSec archive — search by keyword, filter by security pillar or traffic plane.

⌕
⏱CHRONOLOGICAL ERA SCRUBBER
Decade:
122 RECORDS MATCHED
1837
Signaling
7.5

The Optical Telegraph Hack (Chappe Semaphore)

Francois and Joseph Blanc hijacked the French optical telegraph network by bribing operators to insert deliberate backspace/error codes into stock market transmissions. The scheme ran for roughly two years before being exposed in 1836, making it the first documented attack combining an insider, a covert channel, and a financial network.

1844
Data
6.8

First Public Telegraph Line & Wiretap Vulnerability

Samuel Morse transmitted the first message ("What hath God wrought") over the Baltimore–Washington line on May 24, 1844, exposing physical wiretapping along unencrypted DC lines almost immediately.

1865
Signaling
5.0

International Telegraph Union Founded in Paris

On 17 May 1865, after a conference running from 1 March, twenty European states signed the first International Telegraph Convention in Paris and created the International Telegraph Union — the body that became today's ITU.

1866
Data
5.5

Great Eastern Lands the First Durable Transatlantic Telegraph Cable

After the 1858 cable died within weeks and the 1865 attempt snapped mid-ocean, SS Great Eastern left Valentia on 13 July 1866 and spliced the cable ashore at Heart's Content, Newfoundland, on 27 July 1866 — the first durable transatlantic link. The lost 1865 cable was grappled up and completed that September.

1914
Data
8.5

CS Alert Cuts Germany's Channel Cables at the Outbreak of WWI

Within hours of Britain's declaration of war (11 p.m., 4 August 1914), the GPO cable ship CS Alert grappled and cut Germany's telegraph cables in the English Channel, forcing German traffic onto radio and neutral routes that Britain could intercept. Many accounts wrongly credit CS Telconia.

1917
Data
9.5

Room 40 & The Zimmermann Telegram Submarine Cable Interception

The British GPO cable ship CS Alert severed Germany's direct transatlantic subsea cables at the outbreak of WWI, forcing German diplomatic messages onto neutral cables transiting British landing stations where Room 40 intercepted the Zimmermann Telegram.

1934
Voice
6.0

US Communications Act of 1934 Creates the FCC

Signed by President Roosevelt on 19 June 1934, the Communications Act abolished the Federal Radio Commission and created the Federal Communications Commission, uniting regulation of interstate telephone, telegraph and radio under one agency.

1949
Data
6.0

Claude Shannon Publishes "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems"

Shannon's paper in the Bell System Technical Journal (vol. 28, no. 4, October 1949, pp. 656–715) put cryptography on a mathematical footing. It was a declassified version of his confidential 1945 Bell Labs report "A Mathematical Theory of Cryptography".

1962
Video
6.5

Telstar 1: First Active Communications Satellite Relays Live Transatlantic TV

Launched on 10 July 1962 (a privately funded AT&T satellite launched by NASA), Telstar 1 relayed the first public live transatlantic television on 23 July 1962. Radiation from the US Starfish Prime high-altitude nuclear test, detonated the day before launch, contributed to its command system failing in November 1962.

1964
Voice
8.8

AT&T MF Switching & The Captain Crunch Blue Box Era

John Draper ("Captain Crunch"), Steve Wozniak, Steve Jobs and others built Blue Boxes that emitted 2600 Hz plus MF digit tones to make free global calls, industrializing the SF signaling flaw.

1975
Messaging
9.0

Church Committee Exposes NSA Projects SHAMROCK & MINARET Telegram Interception

On 29 October 1975, NSA Director Lew Allen publicly confirmed to the Church Committee that, from 1945 to May 1975, the major US international telegraph carriers secretly passed copies of international telegrams to the NSA without warrants (SHAMROCK). Watch lists including US citizens were run against this traffic (MINARET).

1984
Signaling
5.5

2600: The Hacker Quarterly Launches (Phrack Follows in 1985)

In January 1984, Eric Corley (writing as "Emmanuel Goldstein") and David Ruderman began publishing 2600: The Hacker Quarterly. The title refers to the 2600 Hz trunk-seizure tone, and the first issue appeared in the same month AT&T was broken up. Phrack followed on 17 November 1985, published on the St. Louis "Metal Shop" BBS.

1988
Signaling
9.5

CCITT Standardizes SS7 (Signaling System No. 7)

CCITT standardized the SS7 protocol suite in 1988 across mobile and fixed networks, built on implicit operator trust with no authentication — the root cause of every later signaling attack.

1988
Voice
9.0

Duncan Campbell's "Somebody's Listening" Exposes ECHELON in the New Statesman

On 12 August 1988, Duncan Campbell's New Statesman article "Somebody's Listening" (headlined inside as "They've got it taped") was the first press report to name ECHELON. It described an NSA-run global system, identified as Project P415, to monitor civilian communications, drawing on disclosures by Lockheed engineer Margaret Newsham about RAF Menwith Hill.

1990
Signaling
9.0

AT&T Long Distance Network Collapse

A single line of buggy C code in a 4ESS switch patch caused a cascading SS7 recovery storm on January 15, 1990, dropping roughly 60 million calls over nine hours.

1994
Voice
7.5

CALEA Mandates Wiretap-Ready Telecom Networks

The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) forced US telecom carriers to design their networks so that lawful interception could be performed on demand — embedding a permanent surveillance capability into the core of every switch.

1998
Data
8.9

ICMP Smurf Amplification & Broadcast Reflection Attack Era

After TFreak (Dan Moschuk) released smurf.c in October 1997, attackers spoofed ICMP Echo Requests to the directed-broadcast addresses of misconfigured networks, turning every responding host into an amplifier and flooding victims' uplinks — prompting CERT/CC Advisory CA-1998-01 in January 1998.

2006
Data
7.5

Hengchun Earthquake Severs Nine Asian Subsea Cables in the Luzon Strait

On 26 December 2006 a magnitude ~7 doublet earthquake off Hengchun, southern Taiwan, triggered submarine landslides and turbidity currents that broke nine submarine cables in the Luzon Strait, badly impairing internet and voice links for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and the Philippines.

2008
Signaling
9.8

Dan Kaminsky Discloses DNS Cache-Poisoning Flaw (CVE-2008-1447)

On 8 July 2008, Dan Kaminsky and DNS vendors released coordinated patches for a fundamental DNS cache-poisoning flaw (CVE-2008-1447, CERT VU#800113) affecting ISP resolvers worldwide; full details followed at Black Hat USA in August 2008.

2008
Data
9.0

Pilosov & Kapela Demonstrate Internet-Scale BGP Interception at DEF CON 16

On 10 August 2008 at DEF CON 16, Alex Pilosov and Anton "Tony" Kapela showed in "Stealing The Internet: An Internet-Scale Man In The Middle Attack" that a BGP prefix hijack could be turned into a stealthy interception: they diverted traffic bound for the conference network to a system in New York and delivered it back to Las Vegas.

2008
Signaling
7.5

Tobias Engel Demonstrates SS7 MAP Phone Location Tracking at 25C3

At the 25th Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin on 27 December 2008, Tobias Engel showed that anyone with SS7 access, or a cheap commercial HLR-lookup service, could locate a mobile subscriber to roughly city level without the owner's knowledge.

2008
Voice
7.0

deDECTed: DECT Cordless Telephony Authentication Broken at 25C3

On 29 December 2008 at 25C3, Erik Tews, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann and Andreas Schuler of the deDECTed.org project showed that the secret security of DECT, the standard behind most cordless phones and many baby monitors and payment terminals, could be broken with cheap hardware.

2009
Voice
8.7

The A5/1 Cracking Project (Karsten Nohl at 26C3)

Karsten Nohl and the Chaos Computer Club published a 2-terabyte rainbow-table set at 26C3 enabling real-time over-the-air decryption of A5/1-protected 2G GSM calls and SMS with inexpensive hardware.

2010
Voice
9.1

OpenBTS & OsmocomBB Open-Source GSM Baseband Sniffing Revolution

At 27C3 (December 2010), Harald Welte and Steve Markgraf presented OsmocomBB, a free GSM baseband stack for cheap Calypso phones, while Karsten Nohl and Sylvain Munaut used such phones to capture and decrypt GSM calls with about $15 of consumer hardware.

2010
Voice
8.8

SIPVicious-Era SIP Brute-Force Toll Fraud Wave Against Asterisk & FreePBX PBXs

Through 2009–2010, automated scanners swept the internet for SIP on UDP port 5060 and brute-forced extension credentials on exposed Asterisk and FreePBX systems; the SANS Internet Storm Center flagged the surge in July 2010, and in February 2011 the Sality botnet ran an internet-wide "sipscan" from about 3 million hosts. Compromised PBXs were used to pump calls to high-cost international and premium-rate numbers.

2011
Data
9.6

DigiNotar CA Compromise & Iranian Nationwide Telecom ISP Man-in-the-Middle

An intruder breached Dutch certificate authority DigiNotar in 2011 and issued 531 fraudulent certificates for 344 domains, including *.google.com, which was then used in a man-in-the-middle attack on roughly 300,000 users — more than 99% of them in Iran — according to Fox-IT's "Operation Black Tulip" investigation.

2011
Signaling
9.1

U.S. v. Rigmaiden Brings the FBI's Harris StingRay IMSI-Catcher into Public View, Triggering FOIA Disclosures

In September 2011 the Wall Street Journal reported that the FBI had located fraud suspect Daniel Rigmaiden with a "StingRay" cell-site simulator, and his court challenge became the first U.S. case to test the device; EPIC's 2012 FOIA suit then forced release of FBI StingRay records (2012–2013), and ACLU public-records work (2014–2015) showed widespread, often warrantless state and local use.

2014
Signaling
9.1

Positive Technologies Exposes GTP/GRX Mobile-Internet Hijacking via Internet-Reachable GTP Nodes

Positive Technologies' 2014 report "Vulnerabilities of Mobile Internet (GPRS)", publicized in February 2015, showed that GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) nodes reachable from the internet and the GRX roaming network let attackers brute-force subscriber identities, hijack or block mobile data sessions and obtain subscriber data — building on P1 Security's 2011 "Attacking GRX" research. A 2020 Positive Technologies assessment found every one of 28 tested operators still exploitable via GTP.

2015
Signaling
9.2

LTE Diameter Core Exploits Go Public: P1 Security Shows Diameter Routing Agent Takeover at Hackito Ergo Sum

At Hackito Ergo Sum in Paris (October 2015), P1 Security researchers Laurent Ghigonis and Philippe Langlois showed a remotely exploitable flaw in an LTE Diameter Routing Agent, one of the first public demonstrations that 4G Diameter signaling inherited SS7-style interconnect trust problems; Nokia Bell Labs (2016) and Positive Technologies (2018) then published Diameter location-tracking and denial-of-service attacks over IPX interconnects.

2015
Messaging
9.5

Stagefright Zero-Click MMS Remote Code Execution in Android libstagefright (CVE-2015-1538)

Joshua Drake of Zimperium zLabs disclosed in July 2015 a set of critical memory-corruption flaws in Android's Stagefright media library — CVE-2015-1538 plus the related CVE-2015-1539, CVE-2015-3824, CVE-2015-3826, CVE-2015-3827, CVE-2015-3828, CVE-2015-3829 and CVE-2015-3864 — that let an attacker run code on an estimated 950 million phones via a single silently received MMS video.

2015
Voice
9.0

The Great SIM Heist: NSA & GCHQ Target Gemalto SIM Encryption Keys

On 19 February 2015 The Intercept, citing Snowden documents, reported that a joint NSA–GCHQ team had penetrated Gemalto, the world's largest SIM maker, to steal the Ki keys used to secure mobile communications; Gemalto said a 2010–2011 operation "probably happened" but denied massive key theft.

2015
Data
8.2

WebRTC Local & Public IP Leakage Flaw Disclosed (RFC 5245 / STUN / TURN)

Daniel Roesler's 2015 proof-of-concept showed that the WebRTC JavaScript APIs in Chrome and Firefox let any web page collect a user's private LAN addresses and real public IP — even behind an active VPN. The behaviour had already been tracked by Mozilla as Bugzilla 959893 ("WebRTC Internal IP Address Leakage"); it was treated as a privacy design issue and received no CVE.

2016
Data
8.5

Mirai IoT Botnet Knocks Out Dyn Managed DNS

On 21 October 2016, waves of DDoS traffic from the Mirai botnet hit Dyn's Managed DNS platform, making Twitter, Reddit, GitHub, Netflix, PayPal and other Dyn customers unreachable for many users in North America and Europe.

2018
Data
9.3

Amazon Route 53 BGP Hijack for Cryptocurrency Theft

On 24 April 2018, attackers announced Amazon Route 53 address space from eNet (AS10297), a hosting provider in Columbus, Ohio, hijacking DNS for MyEtherWallet.com for about two hours and stealing roughly $150,000 in Ether.

2019
Signaling
9.0

"The Community" Indictment Exposes Bribed Carrier Insiders Behind SIM-Swap Crypto Thefts

In May 2019 U.S. prosecutors in Michigan charged six members of the hacking group "The Community" and three former mobile-carrier employees (two at AT&T stores, one at Verizon) over SIM swaps used to steal more than $2.4 million in cryptocurrency, documenting insider bribery as a SIM-swap channel. The pattern persisted: the FCC adopted SIM-swap and port-out rules in November 2023, and in November 2025 the Manhattan DA indicted a ring that included four AT&T and T-Mobile store employees.

2021
Data
8.5

T-Mobile US Breach Exposes Personal Data of ~76.6 Million People

In August 2021 T-Mobile US confirmed a breach, later sized at about 76.6 million current, former and prospective customers, exposing names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers and driver's licence data; John Binns, a US citizen living in Turkey, claimed responsibility.

2023
Data
8.8

Balticconnector & Baltic Telecom Cables Damaged by Dragged Anchor of the Newnew Polar Bear

On 7–8 October 2023 the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia, a Finland–Estonia telecom cable and the Sweden–Estonia EE-S1 cable were damaged in the Gulf of Finland and off Hiiumaa; Finland's National Bureau of Investigation recovered a ship's anchor beside the pipeline and linked the damage to the Hong Kong-flagged container ship Newnew Polar Bear.

2023
Data
9.0

Taiwan Matsu Islands Dual Subsea Cable Severance

Two submarine communications cables connecting Taiwan to the Matsu Islands were severed by Chinese fishing and cargo vessels within six days, disconnecting 14,000 residents from broadband internet.

2024
Signaling
8.5

CrowdStrike Exposes LIMINAL PANDA, a Telecom-Specialist Intrusion Actor

On 19 November 2024, alongside Adam Meyers' testimony to the US Senate Judiciary Committee, CrowdStrike named LIMINAL PANDA, an actor targeting telecom providers in South Asia and Africa since at least 2020, and reassigned some activity previously attributed to LightBasin to it.

2024
Signaling
10.0

Salt Typhoon Compromises US Telecom Wiretap Infrastructure

Chinese APT group Salt Typhoon breached the core networks of major US telecom providers — AT&T, Verizon, Lumen and others — reaching CALEA lawful-intercept systems and sustained metadata and audio collection across at least nine carriers.

2024
Voice
8.0

WPP CEO Voice-Clone Impersonation Attempt & FBI Warning on AI-Enabled Vishing

In May 2024, WPP chief executive Mark Read disclosed that fraudsters had used a voice clone and YouTube footage of him in a Microsoft Teams meeting, set up via a WhatsApp account bearing his photo, to try to get an agency leader to set up a new business and hand over money and personal details; the attempt failed. On 8 May 2024 the FBI San Francisco field office warned of escalating AI-enabled phishing and voice/video cloning scams.

2025
Signaling
8.7

EU Escalates NIS2 Enforcement: Reasoned Opinions to 19 Member States over Missed Transposition

NIS2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555) had to be transposed by 17 October 2024, bringing public electronic communications networks and services, IXPs, DNS and other digital-infrastructure providers under mandatory risk-management and incident-reporting duties. After letters of formal notice to 23 Member States in November 2024, the Commission sent reasoned opinions to 19 on 7 May 2025; in July 2026 it referred Ireland, Spain, France and the Netherlands to the EU Court of Justice.

2026
Signaling
9.4

Outlook: 3GPP Release 20 Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration for 5G-Advanced & 6G (TR 33.703, FIPS 203/204)

3GPP SA3 is preparing to migrate 5G and future 6G security to post-quantum cryptography. After the Release 19 cryptographic inventory (TR 33.938), the Release 20 study TR 33.703 evaluates options built on NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), published in August 2024, and a Release 20 normative work item, Post-quantum Cryptography Migration Phase 1, is under way. No PQC scheme has yet been standardized for SUCI.