[ RECORD YEAR ]2015

WebRTC Local & Public IP Leakage Flaw Disclosed (RFC 5245 / STUN / TURN)

Daniel Roesler's 2015 proof-of-concept showed that the WebRTC JavaScript APIs in Chrome and Firefox let any web page collect a user's private LAN addresses and real public IP — even behind an active VPN. The behaviour had already been tracked by Mozilla as Bugzilla 959893 ("WebRTC Internal IP Address Leakage"); it was treated as a privacy design issue and received no CVE.

THREAT SEVERITY
8.2 / 10
Target TechnologyWebRTC, STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT), ICE (Interactive Connectivity Establishment)
OSI Network LayerLayer 7 / Application (WebRTC ICE / STUN)
Threat Actor / AttributionDaniel Roesler (Independent Security Researcher)
Protocol StandardRFC 5245 (ICE), RFC 5389 (STUN), RFC 8828

02Deep-Dive Technical Analysis

WebRTC uses Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE, RFC 5245) and STUN (RFC 5389) to gather candidate addresses for peer-to-peer audio/video sessions across NAT. Calling `RTCPeerConnection` and `createOffer()` made the browser enumerate local network interfaces and send STUN binding requests over UDP, and the resulting host and server-reflexive candidates were readable from JavaScript without any permission prompt. In many VPN configurations those requests did not follow the tunnel, exposing the ISP-assigned address. Mozilla Bugzilla 959893, opened by researchers from BAE Systems Detica, documented the internal-IP exposure and the VPN de-anonymization concern well before the public PoC.

03Vulnerability & Exploit Flow

Exploit Vector

JavaScript-triggered ICE candidate gathering and STUN binding requests that reveal local and public IP addresses outside the VPN tunnel.

04Recommended Defense & Mitigation Protocol

Operator Hardening Strategy

Deploy mDNS local candidate anonymization (`.local` hostnames), restrictive WebRTC IP-handling policies or privacy extensions, and firewall rules that force UDP STUN traffic through the VPN.

05Security Impact & Geopolitical Consequence

Undermined commercial VPN privacy guarantees for millions of users, prompting browsers to add WebRTC IP-handling policies and mDNS hostname obfuscation for host ICE candidates — approaches later codified in RFC 8828 (WebRTC IP Address Handling Requirements).

06Authoritative Standards & External References

07Related Topic Cluster Records

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